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Deception studies emphasize the important role of event-related potentials (ERPs)
to uncover deceptive behavior based on underlying neuro-cognitive processes. The
role of conflict monitoring as indicated by the frontal N2 component during truthful
and deceptive responses was investigated in an adapted Concealed Information
Test (CIT). Previously memorized pictures of faces should either be indicated as
truthfully trustworthy, truthfully untrustworthy or trustworthy while concealing the actual
untrustworthiness (untrustworthy-probe). Mean, baseline-to-peak and peak-to-peak
amplitudes were calculated to examine the robustness of ERP findings across varying
quantification techniques. Data of 30 participants (15 female; age: M = 23.73 years,
SD = 4.09) revealed longer response times and lower correct rates for deceptive
compared to truthful trustworthy responses. The frontal N2 amplitude was more negative
for untrustworthy-probe and truthful untrustworthy compared to truthful trustworthy
stimuli when measured as mean or baseline-to-peak amplitude. Results suggest that
deception evokes conflict monitoring and ERP quantifications are differentially sensitive
to a-priori hypotheses.
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INTRODUCTION
Research addressing the underlying neuro-cognitive processes of deception emphasizes the
promising role of cognitive-motivational processes and event-related potentials (ERP) of the
electroencephalogram (EEG) to differentiate between truthful and deceptive behavior (Johnson
et al., 2004, 2008; Wu et al., 2009; Leue et al., 2012a; Meijer et al., 2014; Leue and Beauducel, 2015,
2019; Fu et al., 2017). If neuro-cognitive processes of deception could be successfully disentangled
in EEG research, its application for social situations might be probed. Most common contents
of deception in everyday life concern personal feelings, attitudes, and opinions (DePaulo et al.,
2003). Sometimes deception can serve to facilitate social interactions, for example, by withholding
personal opinions that would promote disagreements or that would hurt feelings. When deception
goes along withmore serious consequences, it would be in interest of a society, to uncover deceptive
behavior if legal regulations in judicial trials allow for a differentiation of deception and truth by
means of EEG data and if validation of this differentiation could be sufficiently confirmed.
Deception is argued to be a cognitively demanding process and a conflict-inducing behavior.
As honest communication is a basic prerequisite for a well-functioning social interaction and
is deeply anchored in social values, a stimulus that requires a deceptive response can induce a
cognitive conflict between the default tendency to tell the truth and the requirement to deceive.
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It involves the retention of existing knowledge, the suppression
of the tendency to respond truthfully and the invention or
activation of an alternative response (Debey et al., 2014; Walczyk
et al., 2014). These processes require not only working memory
capacity and mental effort by involving executive functions, but
also conflict monitoring and cognitive control (Langleben et al.,
2002; Johnson et al., 2004; Nunez et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2009;
Leue et al., 2012a, 2014; Fu et al., 2017; Koeckritz et al., 2019).
According to the (integrative) conflict monitoring hypothesis
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, 2007) conflict monitoring takes
place in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The ACC sends
out information when a conflict is detected to increase cognitive
control to minimize the occurrence of further conflicts. Thereby
the occurrence of a conflict serves as a teaching signal leading
the selection of task solving strategies (Botvinick, 2007). The
simultaneous activation of competing response options, which
requires the overriding of dominant action tendencies that are
not goal-directed for the task, elicits a conflict. The conflict arises
between the processing paths that lead to correct or incorrect
responses as defined by task instructions (Botvinick et al., 2001;
Yeung et al., 2004; Botvinick, 2007). It has been assumed that
the level of conflict increases as the absolute activation of the
representations of the competing response options increase and
as the number of competing representations increases. Moreover,
the level of conflict reaches a maximum when the activation level
of competing representations is equal (Berlyne, 1957; Botvinick
et al., 2001).
One component of the ERP that has been of interest in the
context of uncovering deception is the N2. The N2 is a stimulus-
locked negative-going component that occurs on fronto-central
recording sites (Fz, FCz, Cz) and peaks around 200–350ms after
stimulus presentation (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Amodio et al.,
2008; Folstein and van Petten, 2008). There is evidence that the
N2 is generated in the ACC and is therefore related to cognitive
control and conflict monitoring in cognitively demanding tasks
(Amodio et al., 2008; Leue et al., 2012c, 2014) like deception.
Consistently, deception studies suggest that the amplitude of
the N2 is more negative after evaluating a stimulus requiring a
deceptive response compared to a truthful response (Wu et al.,
2009; Fu et al., 2017). The current study investigates the role of
conflict monitoring as indicated by the frontal N2 amplitude in
a deception paradigm. In particular, we will examine whether
the amount of conflict monitoring increases the more convinced
subjects are about a social attribute (e.g., trustworthiness)
they should conceal. Behavioral evidence further supports the
assumption that deception is a cognitively demanding process.
Deceptive responses compared to truthful responses are usually
associated with longer response times and a higher error rate
(Meijer et al., 2007; Hu et al., 2011; Leue et al., 2012a; Suchotzki
et al., 2015, 2017; Fu et al., 2017).
Previously, different ERP quantification methods such as
baseline-to-peak amplitude (e.g., Hu et al., 2011) or combined
amplitude and latency measurement (e.g., Gamer and Berti,
2010) were selected to investigate the N2 during deception.
Therefore, we aimed at investigating the robustness of our N2
findings for different ERP quantifications such as mean, baseline-
to-peak, and peak-to-peak amplitudes (Luck, 2014). Leue et al.
(2013) found that the frontal N2 in a go/nogo task can be
measured more reliably as a mean amplitude vs. baseline-to-
peak amplitude depending on filtering and number of nogo
epochs. In contrast, Kleene et al. (2021) revealed a higher
reliability of the frontal N2 in an adapted CIT when measured
as baseline-to-peak or peak-to-peak amplitude than measured as
mean amplitude. Thus, depending on the experimental paradigm
quantification of ERPs matters for ERP reliability. Moreover,
less is known whether empirical findings in a deception
paradigm generalize across ERP quantifications. Therefore,
the generalizability and robustness of ERP findings across
varying quantification techniques contribute to the validation of
experimental findings in a deception paradigm. Three different
quantification methods (mean, baseline-to-peak, and peak-to-
peak amplitude) will be used to report the experimental findings
for the N2 amplitude in an adapted social deception task.
CITs and Adaptions
A frequently used paradigm to study processes underlying
deception by means of concealing knowledge is the Concealed
Information Test (originally Guilty Knowledge Test, GKT;
Lykken, 1959, 1960). The original CIT differentiates two stimulus
types, namely probes and irrelevants (later on three types: probe,
target, irrelevants; see Rosenfeld et al., 1988). Probes are relevant
items that are familiar to the subjects who are supposed to
conceal the familiarity. Irrelevants are unfamiliar to the subjects
who are supposed to truthfully indicate the unfamiliarity. This
original CIT follows the assumption that probes have a special
significance (i.e., stimulus salience) for subjects concealing their
knowledge of these items (for argumentations on orienting
response see Klein Selle et al., 2016, 2017). Thereby, familiar
stimuli compared to unfamiliar stimuli are more salient, as
manifested in amore pronounced P3 component following probe
compared to irrelevant stimuli (Verschuere et al., 2011; Leue and
Beauducel, 2015, 2019). To investigate other cognitive processes
underlying deception (e.g., mental effort) an adaption of the CIT
with a specific experimental condition is an appropriate tool
(Koeckritz et al., 2019; Leue and Beauducel, 2019). Koeckritz
et al. (2019) investigated stimulus salience and mental effort
(i.e., the cognitive capacity that remains when stimuli are
processed) during deception within one paradigm by means
of the P3. Subjects were instructed to conceal knowledge of
faces (probe) in relation to unknown faces (irrelevant) in one
task condition. In another task condition, all stimuli (faces
with a social attribute, namely trustworthiness) were known
prior to the task. For the trustworthiness condition, the stimuli
were classified into three categories. (1) Following probes (i.e.,
untrustworthy stimuli), subjects are supposed to give a deceptive
answer (i.e., to indicate the face would be trustworthy). (2)
Following “trustworthy” stimuli, subjects are supposed to indicate
the attribute truthfully. (3) “Untrustworthy” stimuli have an
opposing attribute expression to trustworthy stimuli and subjects
are asked to indicate the attribute truthfully. Koeckritz et al.
(2019) assigned the faces to the pre-defined attribute categories
randomly (see section 1.3 in Koeckritz et al., 2019). Deception
can induce successive cognitive processes like conflictmonitoring
occurring prior to the investment of P3-related mental effort.
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Conflict monitoring as reflected by the frontal N2 amplitude
(Gamer and Berti, 2010; Fu et al., 2017) was found to be more
negative after stimuli requiring a deceptive vs. truthful response
in previous studies (Wu et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2017). Therefore,
we assume the frontal N2 to be more negative after probes
compared to truthful trustworthy or truthful untrustworthy faces
with instruction-conform responses (hypothesis 1).
Trustworthiness
Social interactions with an unfamiliar person start with a
first impression of the person that is received within a very
short period of time (Willis and Todorov, 2006; Todorov
et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2011). The first impression includes,
among other social and/or physical attributes, the evaluation
of a person’s trustworthiness (Willis and Todorov, 2006;
Engell et al., 2007; Marzi et al., 2014; Meconi et al., 2014).
Trustworthiness as a social attribute has a significant impact
on the likelihood and kind of engaging in social interactions
with the evaluated person (Yang et al., 2011). Moreover,
trustworthiness might be concealed in social interactions
when especially untrustworthiness could not be communicated
without breaking social rules or expectations. Therefore, the
false or concealed evaluation of a person as trustworthy can
be associated with unpleasant consequences and a stronger
cognitive and moral conflict than its truthful declaration.
Following Koeckritz et al. (2019), untrustworthiness of faces is
the characteristic to be deceptively responded to in the current
study. Assuming that the extent of required conflict monitoring
is greater when deceiving about self-related facts vs. non-self-
related facts (Nunez et al., 2005; Hu et al., 2011), it can be
hypothesized that the amount of personal involvement (e.g.,
through intensity of individual beliefs, norms, and values) also
has an impact on the amount of conflict monitoring required
for successful deception. In terms of untrustworthiness, this
would mean that the less trustworthy an individual judges a
face, the stronger the conflict monitoring should be between the
representations of a truthful (untrustworthy) and a deceptive
(trustworthy) response. Thus, deception should elicit more
conflict monitoring in subjects the greater the discrepancy
between actual perceived expressions of trustworthiness and
the deceptive response. This assumption is consistent with
the argumentation of Berlyne (1957) and Botvinick et al.
(2001), who suggest in the context of the conflict-monitoring
hypothesis that the conflict level increases with the absolute
activation level of competing representations and becomes
maximal when they are equal. To investigate the influence of
the absolute activation level, the affective vs. neutral variation
of the presented faces was introduced as another experimental
variation on the conflict monitoring intensity. Affective intensity
of the faces has been evaluated by means of pre-ratings (Ma
et al., 2015). That is, in addition to the stimulus-related
conflict between probes and truthful (un-)trustworthy faces,
we introduce the affective compared to the neutral condition
of the faces as another operationalization of conflicting or
competing representations as presumed by Botvinick et al.
(2001) for non-deception tasks. Overall, we hypothesize larger
(more negative) frontal N2 amplitudes following untrustworthy-
probes compared to truthful stimuli in the affective vs. neutral
condition (hypothesis 2).
Aims and Hypotheses
This study aims at investigating cognitive processes underlying
deception to the social attribute (un)trustworthiness by means
of the frontal N2 amplitude. An adapted CIT has been
used to examine conflict monitoring during deception. It
has been assumed that the evaluation of untrustworthy-probe
stimuli elicits a more negative N2 compared to truthful
trustworthy or truthful untrustworthy stimuli (hypothesis 1:
Picture type main effect). To investigate the intensity of the
participants’ perception of (un)trustworthiness on the conflict
monitoring intensity, we selected stimulus material that had
been judged as neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy (neutral
condition) or as particularly trustworthy or untrustworthy
(affective condition). The discrepancy between perceived and
reported untrustworthiness in untrustworthy-probes is larger
in the affective vs. neutral condition, which is assumed to
enhance conflict monitoring. We hypothesized a more negative
stimulus-related N2 following untrustworthy-probes compared
to truthful (un-)trustworthy pictures in the affective vs. neutral
condition (hypothesis 2: Picture type × Condition interaction).
Furthermore, we examined whether the results for the N2
vary across task sequence (affective-neutral vs. neutral-affective
condition; Picture type× Task sequence interaction) and Gender
of the participant (Picture type × Gender interaction). To
compare the results for the frontal N2 in an adapted CIT,
three quantificationmethods (mean-, baseline-to-peak-, peak-to-
peak amplitude) were performed to investigate the robustness
of the experimental findings for hypothesis 1 and 2. A more
comprehensive understanding of the role of conflict monitoring




Participants were recruited through websites, Facebook groups
and mailing lists of student groups of the University of Kiel
(Germany). A total of 73 right-handed students of the University
of Kiel, Germany (38 female; age: M = 23.88 years, SD = 4.17)
took part in the study. Thirty-six participants had to be excluded
because no response port codes were sent in the initial phase
of the study, which would have been important to disentangle
epochs with correct and incorrect responses. These participants
were used as a pilot sample for paradigm optimization. Of the
37 participants remaining for the present study, seven other
participants had to be excluded due to an insufficient number
of artifact-free epochs (< 25 epochs; see Kleene et al., 2021)
per picture type after conducting the Independent Component
Analysis (ICA; see below). A post-hoc analysis with G∗Power,
version 3.1.9.4 (Faul et al., 2007) with an intended power of
0.80 and a significance level of 0.05, two-tailed, and for a
presumed effect size f of 0.25 revealed an optimal sample size
of 28 participants for an ANOVA F-test with repeated measures
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2.28 (1.38) 2.74 (1.55) 2.51 (1.47) 1.93 (0.90) 2.50 (1.20) 2.22 (1.05)
Truthful trustworthy [CFD picture
numbers: WM-257, WM-252,
WF-242, WF-233]









3.42 (1.38) 3.42 (1.40) 3.42 (1.39) 4.56 (1.39) 3.57 (1.28) 4.06 (1.33)
Truthful trustworthy [CFD picture
numbers: WM-040, WM-018,
WF-241, WF-034]




3.39 (1.45) 3.42 (1.29) 3.40 (1.37) 3.97 (1.38) 3.87 (1.55) 3.92 (1.46)
aMa et al. (2015). Ratings of trustworthiness were assessed using a 7-point likert scale from 1 = not at all trustworthy to 7 = very strongly trustworthy. Rating scores are presented in
mean (standard deviation, SD). Each picture type was presented 50 times per experimental block. Since each picture type consists of 4 pictures, the presentation frequencies between
the individual pictures vary from 12 to 13. In the affective experimental block, pictures W-239, WF-210, WM-252, WF-242, WM-249, WF-237 were presented 13 times, pictures WM-
010, WM-243, WM-257, WF-233, WM-220, WF-222 were presented 12 times. In the neutral experimental block, pictures WM-251, WM-006, WM-040, WM-018, WM-230, WM-031
were presented 13 times, pictures WF-221, WF-202, WF-241, WF-034, WF-009, WF-245 were presented 12 times.
within-between interaction. According to Cohen (1988), effect
size d can be transferred into f because f is applied as an effect
size in G∗Power 3.1.9.4. The final sample consisted of 30 students
(15 female; age: M = 23.73 years, SD = 4.09). All participants
reported normal or corrected to normal vision. Due to the
significant reduction of the sample, the study design was reduced
to an experimental design without differential psychological
variables. The study was confirmed by the Ethics Committee of
the Medical Faculty of Kiel University, Germany (May, 2019).
Adapted CIT
Twenty-four pictures of faces with neutral facial expressions were
taken from the Chicago Face Database (CFD), which provides
norming data and subjective ratings such as trustworthiness of
independent judges for each picture (Ma et al., 2015). In order to
balance cultural and gender effects in the stimulus material, 12
female and 12 male faces of the white ethnic group were chosen.
The adapted CIT contained two blocks, implementing
an affective and a neutral condition, and three types of
pictures. Truthful trustworthy pictures show trustworthy faces
whose trustworthiness should be truthfully indicated by button
press (right arrow). Truthful untrustworthy pictures show
untrustworthy faces whose trustworthiness should be truthfully
indicated by button press (left arrow). Untrustworthy-probe
pictures show untrustworthy faces whose untrustworthiness
should be concealed by participants, who instead indicate
trustworthiness (right arrow). The assignment of trustworthiness
to the response keys was not counterbalanced across participants.
In the affective condition, faces were assigned to the picture types
according to their trustworthiness score in the pre-rating of Ma
et al. (2015). Thereby, faces of the two most trustworthy men and
women according to the pre-rating of the CFD (Ma et al., 2015)
were selected as truthful trustworthy pictures, while faces of the
four least trustworthy men and women were randomly assigned
to the truthful untrustworthy or untrustworthy-probe categories
(Table 1). This assignment of the pictures to the picture types was
constant across participants.
In the neutral condition, the six male and six female faces with
the most neutral expression of trustworthiness according to the
pre-rating of the CFD were selected and randomly assigned to
truthful trustworthy, truthful untrustworthy and untrustworthy-
probe categories (Table 1). Results of a manipulation check using
independent two-sample t-tests revealed that in total the current
sample rated the faces marginally more trustworthy than the
CFD sample, t(78) = 1.82, p = 0.07 (https://www.graphpad.
com/quickcalcs/ttest1/?Format=SD). The number of raters per
picture varied between n = 23 and 94 in the CFD (Ma et al.,
2015) and was constant with n = 37 raters in the current study.
Looking at the particular picture types, in the affective condition
the current sample rated the truthful trustworthy picture type
significantly more trustworthy than the CFD sample, t(61) = 4.28,
p < 0.01. In the neutral condition, the current sample rated
all picture types at least marginally more trustworthy than the
CFD sample [truthful trustworthy: t(94) = 2.91, p= 0.01; truthful
untrustworthy: t(94) = 1.76, p= 0.08; untrustworthy-probes: t(77)
= 2.08, p = 0.04]. Trustworthiness ratings obtained from the
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current sample differed significantly between the affective and
neutral conditions for all picture types [truthful trustworthy: t(36)
= 6.37, p < 0.01; truthful untrustworthy: t(36) = 6.49, p < 0.01;
untrustworthy-probes: t(36) = 14.75, p < 0.01]. As expected, the
faces of the present study were mostly rated significantly more
trustworthy or untrustworthy in the affective compared to the
neutral condition. For descriptives see Table 1.
Instructions were presented in white letters (Arial, 19 pt) on
a black 17′′ flat screen. In a 7-min learning phase, all 12 faces
of the respective condition were presented with three headings
indicating the picture type. A practice series involved 15 trials (5
of each picture type). If more than three errors were committed
during the 15 practice trials, the instructions were shown again
and the practice trials were repeated. In the experimental block
participants performed 150 trials (50 of each picture type; 1:1:1
ratio between untrustworthy-probes, truthful trustworthy and
truthful untrustworthy) presented in a pseudorandomized order.
After a 2-min break separating the two experimental blocks, the
procedure was repeated for the second condition. To control
for sequence effects, the task sequence affective-neutral (n = 15)
vs. neutral-affective (n = 15) was pseudo-randomly balanced
across participants.
Each trial sequence (Figure 1) started with a fixation point
which was presented in the center of the screen for 1,000ms
followed by a picture (picture size: 611 × 429.5 pixels) presented
for 700ms. After the picture disappeared, the screen remained
black and the participant had a maximum of 2,000ms to
indicate the trustworthiness of the face by pressing the left
(untrustworthy) or right (trustworthy) arrow key in accordance
with instruction. Feedback was provided according to the
actual performance immediately after the response for 500ms,
whereby the word “Richtig!” (German for “correct”) appeared
on the screen, if the participant had responded according to
the instructions in the predefined time interval. Otherwise, the
word “Falsch!” (German for “wrong”) appeared. The inter-trial-
interval (ITI) varied in a pseudorandomized order between 1,000,
1,500, and 2,000ms. During an ITI the screen remained black.
The trial sequence was identical to the study of Koeckritz et al.
(2019), but with differences in stimulus material, number of
pictures and trials, and feedback.
Procedure
After arriving, participants gave written informed consent. They
were placed at a distance of ∼70 cm in front of the screen
and were prepared for EEG recording. For the presentation of
the adapted CIT Presentation V18.1 (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, NY, USA) was used. The completion of the task,
including learning, practice, and experimental phases, took
on average 50min. After completion of the adapted CIT the
manipulation check was conducted, and participants completed
the figural (numbers of task group: 7–9) and memory test
(numbers of task group: 10–11) of the German Intelligenz-
Struktur-Test 2000 R (Liepmann et al., 2007) and the German
BIS/BAS scales (Strobel et al., 2001). The results of the personality
traits are not reported here as the sample size was too small
for testing hypotheses on trait variables. The whole examination
lasted 2.5 h on average. At the end of the examination, remaining
questions were answered, the participants were thanked and
given a course credit of 2.5 h or 20e.
EEG Recording
The EEG recording and pre-processing were performed in
accordance with recommended guidelines for EEG research
(Picton et al., 2000; Keil et al., 2014). EEG was recorded with
64 active scalp electrodes arranged according to the 10/20
system (Jasper, 1958) using the ActiveTwo EEG system (BioSemi,
Amsterdam, Netherlands). The electrooculogram (EOG) was
recorded from two additional horizontal electrodes placed
beyond the epicanthi of both eyes and one vertical electrode
located ∼1 cm below the right eye. The ground electrode was
formed by the Common Mode Sense active electrode (CMS)
and the Driven Right Leg passive electrode (DRL). The signals
were digitized at 512Hz sampling rate on a computer using
ActiView software (BioSemi). The impedances were kept within
±30 k during EEG recording. Offline analysis was conducted
using EEGLab v2019.1 (Delorme and Makeig, 2004) based on
MATLAB 9.8.0 (The MathWorks). Prior to ERP analysis, an
offline high-pass filter of 1Hz and an offline low-pass filter of
15Hz were applied (Amodio et al., 2008; Leue et al., 2013). The
average signal of the mastoids (P9 and P10) was used to re-
reference the data. Independent component analysis (ICA) was
applied to correct for ocular artifacts (Mognon et al., 2011).
Epochs containing further technical and muscular artifacts were
rejected when the EEG signal exceeded ±85 µV. Grand averages
(0–1,000ms post-stimulus, with a 100ms pre-stimulus baseline)
indicate a N2 amplitude between 200 and 275ms post-stimulus
at FCz (Figure 2; for grand averages at Fz, Cz, and Pz see
Supplementary Figures 1–3) and a P2 amplitude between 135
and 200ms post-stimulus for the calculation of the N2 peak-
to-peak amplitude. Following Kleene et al. (2021), the N2 was
quantified as mean amplitude, baseline-to-peak amplitude (the
most negative peak in the defined time interval), and peak-
to-peak amplitude (measured as baseline-to-peak N2 minus
baseline-to-peak P2) to allow a comparison of quantification
methods (Luck, 2014).
Statistical Analysis
IBM SPSS (Version 25) was used for statistical analyses. Separate
repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for behavioral data
including percentage of correct responses and response times,
for ERP data including the mean N2 amplitudes, the baseline-
to-peak N2 amplitudes and the peak-to-peak N2 amplitudes.
Picture type and Condition (affective vs. neural) were applied
as repeated-measures factors in ANOVAs for behavioral data
and N2 amplitudes. Furthermore, Electrode position (Fz, FCz,
Cz, Pz) was included as a repeated-measures factor in the
ANOVAs for N2 amplitudes. To examine whether the N2 and
behavioral data vary depending on gender and task sequence,
Task sequence (affective-neutral vs. neutral-affective condition)
and Gender of the participants were applied as between-subject
factors in ANOVAs for behavioral data and N2 amplitudes
to perform a statistical design that corresponds to Koeckritz
et al. (2019). Whenever the sphericity assumption was violated
(e.g., numerator df ≥ 2), Greenhouse-Geisser correction was
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FIGURE 1 | Trial sequence for one item of each picture type (untrustworthy-probe, truthful untrustworthy, truthful trustworthy). The affective and neutral condition
follow the same trial sequence and differ only in the stimulus material. For stimulus material please see Table 1 and the Chicago Face Database (Ma et al., 2015).
Inter-trial-intervals are not presented in this figure. The feedback “Richtig!” means “correct!” in German, “Falsch!” means “wrong!”.
used and Greenhouse-Geisser epsilon (ε) is reported along with
uncorrected degrees of freedom. In addition to p-values that
are presented for (two-tailed) tests, partial eta square (ηp
2)
is reported to evaluate the effect size. For the comparison of
the quantification methods (mean, baseline-to-peak and peak-
to-peak amplitude) effect sizes were transformed from ηp
2 to
effect size d into coefficient r. Transformation was conducted




A significant main effect of Position was observed, F(3, 78) =
10.22, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.28, ε = 0.37. Simple contrasts revealed
a more negative N2 amplitude at FCz compared to Fz, F(1, 26)
= 7.25, p = 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.22, and compared to Pz, F(1, 26) =
13.63, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.34, and a more negative N2 amplitude
at Fz compared to Pz, F(1, 26) = 5.68, p = 0.03, ηp
2 = 0.18
(Table 2, for an overview of all N2 amplitudes for the main
and interaction effects of Picture type, Condition, and Task
sequence, see Supplementary Tables 1–4). Furthermore, there
was a significant Picture type main effect, F(2, 52) = 5.23, p= 0.01,
ηp
2 = 0.17, ε = 0.94. Simple contrasts revealed a significantly
more negative N2 amplitude for untrustworthy-probes compared
to truthful trustworthy pictures, F(1, 26) = 7.01, p = 0.01, ηp
2
= 0.21, and for truthful untrustworthy pictures compared to
truthful trustworthy pictures, F(1, 26) = 8.27, p = 0.01, ηp
2 =
0.24, but not for untrustworthy-probe compared to truthful
untrustworthy pictures, F(1, 26) = 0.64, p = 0.43 (Table 2). There
were no significant interactions of Picture type × Condition,
F(2, 52) = 1.37, p = 0.26, ε = 0.86, Picture type × Task sequence,
F(2, 52) = 1.45, p = 0.24, ε = 0.94, or Picture type × Gender,
F(2, 52) = 0.47, p =. 62, ε = 0.94 (for the results of a post-hoc
exploration of all remaining main effects, two-way interactions
and higher-order interactions see Supplementary Table 4).
Baseline-To-Peak N2 Amplitude
A significant main effect of Position was observed, F(3, 78) =
10.90, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.30, ε = 0.39. Simple contrasts revealed
a more negative N2 amplitude at FCz compared to Fz, F(1, 26)
= 6.22, p = 0.02, ηp
2 = 0.19, and compared to Pz, F(1, 26)
= 14.37, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.36 and a more negative N2
amplitude at Fz compared to Pz, F(1, 26) = 6.09, p = 0.02,
ηp
2 = 0.19 (Table 2). Furthermore, there was a significant Picture
type main effect, F(2, 52) = 3.30, p < 0.05, ηp
2 = 0.11, ε =
0.93. Simple contrasts revealed a significantly more negative
N2 amplitude for untrustworthy-probes compared to truthful
trustworthy pictures, F(1, 26) = 6.11, p = 0.02, ηp
2 = 0.19,
and for truthful untrustworthy pictures compared to truthful
trustworthy pictures, F(1, 26) = 5.18, p = 0.03, ηp
2 = 0.17, but
not for untrustworthy-probe compared to truthful untrustworthy
pictures, F(1, 26) = 0.01, p= 0.92 (Table 2). We found a marginal
interaction of Picture type × Task sequence, F(2, 52) = 2.75, p =
0.08, ηp
2 = 0.10, ε = 0.93 (Figure 3). There were no significant
interactions of Picture type×Condition, F(2, 52) = 0.01, p= 0.99,
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FIGURE 2 | Stimulus-locked grand averages at FCz from 0 to 1,000ms post-stimulus, with a 100ms pre-stimulus baseline for three picture types
(untrustworthy-probe, truthful untrustworthy, truthful trustworthy) in the affective condition (A) and neutral condition (B). Stimulus was presented from 0 to 700ms. N2
amplitudes were identified between 200 and 275ms post-stimulus.
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TABLE 2 | N2 amplitudes in microvolt (µV) for electrode position and picture type based on different quantifications.
Mean amplitude Baseline-to-peak amplitude Peak-to-peak amplitude N2-P2
Electrode positiona
Fz −2.43 (3.56) [0.65] −4.71 (3.86) [0.70] −12.57 (6.58) [1.20]
FCz −3.00 (3.43) [0.63] −5.27 (3.69) [0.67] −13.08 (6.94) [1.27]
Cz −2.95 (3.35) [0.61] −5.31 (3.55) [0.65] −12.40 (7.18) [1.32]
Pz −0.26 (3.83) [0.70] −2.58 (3.59) [0.66] −7.50 (5.74) [1.05]
Picture typeb
Untrustworthy-probe −3.13 (3.38) [0.62] −5.45 (3.65) [0.67] −13.19 (7.07) [1.29]
Truthful untrustworthy −3.25 (3.72) [0.68] −5.42 (4.07) [0.74] −13.18 (7.14) [1.30]
Truthful trustworthy −2.64 (3.44) [0.63] −4.95 (3.60) [0.66] −12.87 (6.76) [1.23]
Scores are presented in mean (standard deviation, SD) [standard error of the mean, SEM]. aAmplitudes are averaged over picture types and conditions. bAmplitudes at FCz averaged
over the conditions (affective vs. neutral).
ε = 0.99, or Picture type × Gender, F(2, 52) = 0.24, p = 0.77, ε
= 0.93 (for the results of a post-hoc exploration of all remaining
main effects, two-way interactions and higher-order interactions
see Supplementary Table 4).
Peak-To-Peak N2 Amplitude
A significant main effect of Position was observed, F(3, 78) =
29.38, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.53, ε = 0.46. Simple contrasts revealed
a marginally more negative peak-to-peak N2 amplitude at FCz
compared to Fz, F(1, 26) = 3.43, p = 0.08, ηp
2 = 0.12, and
a significantly more negative FCz amplitude compared to Cz,
F(1, 26) = 5.33, p = 0.03, ηp
2 = 0.17, and compared to Pz, F(1, 26)
= 38.79, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.60. Furthermore, peak-to-peak N2
amplitudes were found to be more negative at Fz compared to
Pz, F(1, 26) = 26.63, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.51 and at Cz compared to
Pz, F(1, 26) = 41.85, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.62 (Table 2). In contrast to
the other two quantifications, we found a significant interaction
of Picture type × Condition, F(2, 52) = 5.34, p = 0.01, ηp
2 =
0.17, ε = 0.96, but no Picture type main effect, F(2, 52) = 1.16,
p = 0.32, ε = 0.81. As indicated by the main effect of Picture
type in the affective Condition, F(2, 58) = 5.59, p = 0.01, ηp
2 =
0.16, ε = 0.99, the peak-to-peak N2 amplitude was significantly
more negative following untrustworthy-probes compared to
truthful trustworthy pictures, F(1, 29) = 9.11, p = 0.01, ηp
2 =
0.24, and following truthful untrustworthy compared to truthful
trustworthy pictures, F(1, 29) = 7.47, p = 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.21,
but not following untrustworthy-probes compared to truthful
untrustworthy pictures, F(1, 29) < 0.01, p = 0.96 (Figure 4).
The Picture type main effect in the neutral Condition was not
significant, F(2, 58) = 1.26, p = 0.29, ε = 0.96. There were no
interactions of Picture type × Task sequence, F(2, 52) = 0.36, p =
0.66, ε = 0.81, or Picture type× Gender, F(2, 52) = 1.48, p= 0.24,
ε = 0.81 (for the results of a post-hoc exploration of all remaining
main effects, two-way interactions and higher-order interactions
see Supplementary Table 4).
Comparison of Quantification Methods
The main effect of Position for the N2 amplitude was found to
be robust across all quantification methods (mean amplitude,
baseline-to-peak amplitude and peak-to-peak amplitude). Small
effect sizes r were found for mean amplitudes (r = 0.19) and
baseline-to-peak amplitudes (r = 0.21) whereas a moderate
effect was found for the peak-to-peak amplitude (r = 0.49;
Table 3). The Picture type main effect was only found to
be robust across mean and baseline-to-peak amplitude. Small
effect sizes r were observed for both quantification methods
(mean amplitude: r = 0.10; baseline-to-peak: r = 0.05; Table 3).
Thereby, the correlations between the trustworthiness ratings
of the stimuli obtained from the current sample and the
picture-wise N2 amplitudes are significant only in a few cases
(see Supplementary Table 5). The expected Picture type ×
Condition interaction was only revealed using the peak-to-
peak quantification. Thus,mean and baseline-to-peak amplitudes
were appropriate to illustrate the expected Picture type main
effect, whereas the peak-to-peak amplitude was particularly
qualified to illustrate the Picture type× Condition interaction as
predicted in hypothesis 2.
Behavioral Data
For the percentage of correct responses there was a significant
Picture type main effect, F(2, 52) = 8.72, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.25, ε =
0.91. Simple contrasts indicated a significantly higher correct rate
(i.e., percentage of correct responses) for truthful trustworthy
pictures compared to untrustworthy-probe pictures, F(1, 26) =
14.70, p < 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.36, and for truthful trustworthy pictures
compared to truthful untrustworthy pictures, F(1, 26) = 7.87,
p = 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.23 (Table 4; for an overview of percentage
of correct responses and response times for the main and
interaction effects of Picture type, Condition, and Task sequence,
see Supplementary Tables 6–9). The correct rates of the latter
two picture types did not differ significantly, F(1, 26) = 1.07,
p = 0.31. A marginally significant interaction of Picture type
× Task sequence was found for the correct rate of responses,
F(2, 52) = 2.64, p = 0.09, ηp
2 = 0.09, ε = 0.91 (Figure 5).
No significant interactions for correct rates were found for
Picture type × Condition, F(2, 52) = 0.90, p = 0.40, ε = 0.87,
or Picture type × Gender, F(2, 52) = 1.33, p = 0.27, ε = 0.91
(for the results of a post-hoc exploration of all remaining main
effects, two-way interactions and higher-order interactions see
Supplementary Table 9).
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FIGURE 3 | Baseline-to-peak amplitude in microvolt (µV) and standard errors averaged over electrode positions (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz) per picture type and task sequence
(affective-neutral vs. neutral-affective). probe, untrustworthy-probe; utw, truthful untrustworthy; tw, truthful trustworthy.
FIGURE 4 | Peak-to-peak amplitude in microvolt (µV) and standard errors averaged over electrode positions (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz) per picture type and conditions
(affective vs. neutral). probe, untrustworthy-probe; utw, truthful untrustworthy; tw, truthful trustworthy.
There was a significant Picture type main effect of mean
response times in correct trials, F(2, 52) = 7.61, p < 0.01, ηp
2
= 0.23, ε = 0.85. Simple contrasts revealed significantly shorter
response times to truthful trustworthy pictures compared to
untrustworthy-probe pictures, F(1, 26) = 13.05, p < 0.01, ηp
2 =
0.33, and in truthful trustworthy pictures compared to truthful
untrustworthy pictures, F(1, 26) = 4.68, p = 0.04, ηp
2 = 0.13
(Table 4). Response times for truthful untrustworthy pictures
were only marginally shorter than for untrustworthy-probes,
F(1, 26) = 3.42, p = 0.08, ηp
2 = 0.12. A significant interaction
of Picture type × Task sequence was found, F(2, 52) = 4.53, p =
0.02, ηp
2 = 0.24, ε = 0.85. This interaction can be attributed to a
main effect of Picture type in the Task sequence affective-neutral,
F(2, 28) = 11.06, p< 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.44, ε= 0.99, where significantly
shorter response times were found for truthful trustworthy
pictures compared to untrustworthy-probe, F(1, 14) = 12.41, p <
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TABLE 3 | Comparison of effect sizes between effects measured with mean, baseline-to-peak and peak-to-peak amplitude.
















































* is significant. + is marginally significant. r = effect size r.
0.01, ηp
2 = 0.47, and truthful untrustworthy pictures, F(1, 14) =
19.53, p< 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.58, but not between untrustworthy-probe
and truthful untrustworthy pictures, F(1, 14) = 0.76, p= 0.40. The
Picture type main effect in the Task sequence neutral-affective
was only marginally significant, F(2, 28) = 3.86, p = 0.05, ηp
2 =
0.22, ε = 0.71 (Figure 6). No significant effects regarding mean
response times were found for Picture type × Condition, F(2, 52)
= 0.85, p = 0.42, ηp
2 = 0.03, ε = 0.84, or Picture type× Gender,
F(2, 52) = 0.03, p = 0.95, ε = 0.85 (for the results of a post-hoc
exploration of all remaining main effects, two-way interactions
and higher-order interactions see Supplementary Table 9).
DISCUSSION
In order to further understand the role of conflict monitoring in a
social deception task, we investigated frontal N2 effects using an
adapted CIT involving the social attribute (un)trustworthiness.
Participants were instructed to either truthfully indicate
a face’s trustworthiness (truthful trustworthy), truthfully
indicate a face’s untrustworthiness (truthful untrustworthy),
or conceal a face’s untrustworthiness (untrustworthy-
probe). We expected the N2 amplitude to be more negative
following untrustworthy-probe stimuli compared to truthful
trustworthy or truthful untrustworthy stimuli (hypothesis
1), as deception required increased conflict monitoring
in previous deception studies (Wu et al., 2009; Fu et al.,
2017). Furthermore, we hypothesized a larger frontal N2
amplitude following untrustworthy-probes compared to
truthful trustworthy or truthful untrustworthy stimuli in
the affective vs. neutral condition (hypothesis 2). Three
quantification methods (mean, baseline-to-peak-, peak-to-peak
amplitude) were compared, in order to identify the most
applicable quantification method for the frontal N2 in an
adapted CIT.
The main results of the study were the following: The typical
N2 position effect (cf. Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003; Amodio et al.,
2008; Folstein and van Petten, 2008) was found indicating a
more pronounced N2 at fronto-central sites (FCz) compared
to fronto (Fz) and parietal sites (Pz). Applying the mean
or baseline-to-peak quantification, a Picture type main effect
was found. According to hypothesis 1, a more negative
frontal N2 amplitude was found following untrustworthy-probes
compared to truthful trustworthy stimuli. This result is in line
with the assumption that deceptive responses involve conflict
monitoring (Wu et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2017). Unexpectedly,
the frontal N2 amplitude was also more negative following
truthful untrustworthy stimuli compared to truthful trustworthy
stimuli and equally negative between truthful untrustworthy
stimuli and untrustworthy-probes. This suggests that the frontal
N2 amplitude is sensitive to affective evaluations of social
attributes in a social deception task. Botvinick (2007) as well
as Dreisbach and Fischer (2011) argued that aversive signals of
various kinds (e.g., response-conflict, negative feedback, pain,
social rejection) can trigger compensatory shifts in control
and either mobilize effort or lead to task avoidance. In the
current study, the aversive evaluation of the social attribute
untrustworthiness might have served as an aversive signal itself
even in the absence of response conflict. Since task avoidance
was not an option, cognitive effort was increased by an activation
of the ACC, illustrated by a more negative N2 amplitude
(Dreisbach and Fischer, 2011). Another possible explanation
is the occurrence of an increased conflict following truthful
untrustworthy pictures between the action tendencies to assign
these pictures to the truthful untrustworthy or untrustworthy-
probe type before even considering a deceptive response
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, 2007). In addition to a 1:1:1
picture type ratio, two-thirds of the stimuli should be responded
to with “trustworthy.” Thus, the truthful untrustworthy picture
type differs from the other two picture types in response
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TABLE 4 | Percentage of correct responses (%) and mean response times (ms) in
correct trials.




Overall 96.63 (3.60) [0.66] 353.88 (146.39) [26.73]
Affective 96.80 (5.11) [0.93] 347.70 (163.15) [29.79]
Neutral 96.47 (5.63) [1.03] 360.06 (161.52) [29.49]
Truthful untrustworthy
Overall 97.03 (3.42) [0.62] 341.94 (151.84) [27.72]
Affective 97.73 (3.39) [0.62] 335.34 (156.63) [28.60]
Neutral 96.33 (5.29) [0.97] 348.55 (165.47) [30.21]
Truthful trustworthy
Overall 98.52 (2.25) [0.41] 321.85 (135.75) [24.79]
Affective 99.33 (1.42) [0.26] 304.60 (126.95) [23.18]
Neutral 97.71 (4.02) [0.74] 339.10 (160.56) [29.31]
Scores are presented in mean (standard deviation, SD) [standard error of the mean, SEM].
frequency. The anticipated rareness of the “untrustworthy”
response vs. the more frequent “trustworthy” responses might
be a source of the conflict that is expressed in an increased N2
amplitude following truthful untrustworthy pictures. However,
previous N2 effects for example in go/nogo tasks referred to
the stimulus ratio and not to an anticipated response ratio
(Leue et al., 2012b). Thus, effects of varying response ratios
on the N2-related conflict monitoring intensity in deception
tasks have not yet been studied. To investigate the influence
of response frequency, future studies could also implement
a trustworthy-probe picture type and use other paradigms
such as the Differentiation of Deception Paradigm (Furedy
et al., 1988) that has been used in previous studies, which
reported increased conflict monitoring (in terms of a more
negative N2) during deception (Hu et al., 2011; Suchotzki
et al., 2015; but see Pfister et al., 2014). All N2 findings on
picture type were independent of the participants’ gender and
task sequence.
Addressing hypothesis 2, a more negative N2 peak-to-
peak amplitude was found following untrustworthy-probes
compared to truthful trustworthy pictures and also following
truthful untrustworthy compared to truthful trustworthy
pictures but not following untrustworthy-probes compared
to truthful untrustworthy pictures in the affective vs. neutral
condition. This suggests that the amount of conflict monitoring
not only increases as the subject’s conviction of the faces
untrustworthiness that has to be concealed increases, but also
as truthful untrustworthy pictures appeared. As described
earlier, two thirds of the stimuli should be responded to with
“trustworthy” and only one third with “untrustworthy.” The
rarity of the to-be-prepared “untrustworthy” response may have
led to a default tendency to prepare a “trustworthy” response. It is
possible that the need to prepare a rare “untrustworthy” response
may have resulted in a conflict with this default tendency,
expressed by an increased N2. In this respect, we cannot exclude
that the increased N2 following untrustworthy stimuli reflects
more than one cognitive process that is related to conflict
monitoring. These cognitive processes could be disentangled in
future studies using principal component analysis (Sun et al.,
2011). Applying the mean or baseline-to-peak quantification,
hypothesis 2 could not be confirmed for the Picture type ×
Condition interaction. Although Luck (2014) argues that peak-
to-peak amplitudes in the sense of difference waves might have
a worse signal-to-noise ratio, a higher number of artifact-free
epochs (here at least 25 artifact-free epochs) might, however,
improve the signal-to-noise ratio in a deception task (cf.
Kleene et al., 2021 for reliability of the N2 in another deception
task). This might explain why the Picture type × Condition
interaction was particularly observed for the peak-to-peak
amplitude. Moreover, we did not investigate difference waves
of the experimental conditions but inserted each experimental
condition in the statistical analysis.
The mean and baseline-to-peak N2 amplitudes were found
to cover the Picture type × Condition interaction, whereas
the peak-to-peak quantification as one option to disentangle
ERP components highlights conflict monitoring intensity during
deception especially following faces that were rated more
affectively untrustworthy (Dignath et al., 2020). These results
suggest that the selection of the quantification method should
be part of a hypothesis-related investigation of the N2 amplitude
in an adapted social deception task. More specifically, mean and
baseline-to-peak amplitudes are superior for examining the main
effect of picture type, whereas the peak-to-peak amplitude should
be used to investigate the differentiation of the extent of conflict
monitoring between conditions. To which other hypotheses the
findings on quantification methods can be extended should be
investigated in future studies.
Analyses of the behavioral data revealed lower correct rates
following deceptive stimuli (untrustworthy-probe) compared to
truthful trustworthy stimuli. However, correct rates did not
differ between untrustworthy-probe and truthful untrustworthy
stimuli. Response times were significantly shorter following
truthful trustworthy compared to untrustworthy-probe and
truthful untrustworthy stimuli, but did not differ between the
latter two. There was only one category of trustworthy faces
(truthful trustworthy) but two categories of untrustworthy faces
(untrustworthy-probe and truthful untrustworthy). Thus, the
higher conflict monitoring intensity to untrustworthy compared
to trustworthy stimuli might be either due to more cognitive
demand or more aversiveness of the anticipated “untrustworthy”
response (Leue et al., 2012a, 2014). Moreover, the truthful
untrustworthy stimuli were the only category to be responded
to with “untrustworthy.” Thus, a comparatively slower response
time following truthful untrustworthy stimuli may also have
resulted from the rareness of the response.
Limitations and Future Directions
It should be mentioned that the current study examined
instructed deception. Although it has been demonstrated
that both, voluntary (e.g., self-chosen deceptive stimuli) and
instructed deception involve conflict monitoring (e.g., Hu et al.,
2011, 2015; Leue and Beauducel, 2015), it would be interesting to
further investigate the role of the intention to deceive, especially
in social deception situations. Accordingly, Sai et al. (2018) stated
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FIGURE 5 | Percentage of correct responses and standard errors per picture type and task sequence. probe, untrustworthy-probe; utw, truthful untrustworthy; tw,
truthful trustworthy.
FIGURE 6 | Response times in milliseconds (ms) and standard errors per picture type and task sequence. probe, untrustworthy-probe; utw, truthful untrustworthy; tw,
truthful trustworthy.
that it is the deceptive intention that elicits conflict in a social
deception situation, not the false content of a deceptive response.
As mentioned in the Methods, the assignment of
trustworthiness to the response keys and the assignment of
the neutral pictures to the picture types were constant across
participants (cf. Koeckritz et al., 2019). To avoid any potential
influences of key selection and picture assignment in the neutral
condition, both assignments should be counterbalanced in
further studies. Furthermore, a comparison of P3 findings based
on Koeckritz et al.’s (2019) trustworthiness condition and the
present trustworthiness condition would be worthwhile in
future research.
A major limitation of the current study was the reduced
sample size that did not allow for analysis of personality traits
that may affect the neurocognitive processes during deception.
Therefore, further studies are needed to investigate the role of
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conflict monitoring during deception depending on personality
traits such as expression of the behavioral inhibition system (BIS).
Since it can be assumed that deception is based on an interplay of
several complex neurocognitive processes, further research could
consider additional processes and broaden the focus to include
not only stimulus-locked but also response-locked ERPs. One
promising process that should be studied in future in the context
of deception with social attributes is cognitive control, which also
involves the ACC and is reflected by the ERN/Ne (Johnson et al.,
2004, 2008; Leue et al., 2012a). More information about the role
of cognitive control in deception about social attributes would
not only further our understanding of the neurocognitive basis
of deception but may also improve the detection of truthful and
deceptive responses.
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